Congressional Record S. Res. 292 - Page 15162-64 Reduction of U.S. Forces Stationed in Europe by Mansfield, Mike, 1903-2001
University of Montana
ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches Mike Mansfield Papers
12-1-1969
Congressional Record S. Res. 292 - Page 15162-64
Reduction of U.S. Forces Stationed in Europe
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches
This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "Congressional Record S. Res. 292 - Page 15162-64 Reduction of U.S. Forces Stationed in Europe"
(1969). Mike Mansfield Speeches. 810.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/810
:.... _.,. 
S H) I 62 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE /)('('( '111 {)(' 1' 1, /.'}(jf/ 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that I may proceed 
for 20 minutes. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection, it Is so ordered. 
SENATE RESOLUTION 292---SUBMIS-
SION OF A SENATE RESOLUTION 
RELATING TO SUBSTANTIAL RE-
DUCTION OF U.S. FORCES PER-
MANENTLY STATIONED IN EU-
ROPE 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at 
this time this country has 429 major 
bases overseas and 2,297 lesser bases. 
These bases cover 4,000 square miles and 
are located in 30 countries. Stationed on 
these bases are 1,750,000 servicemen, 
families, and foreign employees, and the 
cost for maintaining these bases is ap-
proximately $4.8 billion a year. 
Mr. President, I would like to discuss 
one area in which we have a large num-
ber of bases and an extraordinarily large 
number of troops, namely, Western 
Europe. 
On January 19, 1967, I submitted Sen-
ate Resolution 49 which expressed the 
sense of the Senate that "a substantial 
resolution of U.S. forces permanently 
stationed in Europe can be made with-
out adversely affecting either our resolve 
or ability to meet our commitment 
under the North Atlantic Treaty." I wish 
to introduce an identical resolution 
again today and ask unanimous consent 
that its text be printed in the RECORD at 
the conclusion of my remarks and that 
the resolution be referred to both the 
Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Armed Services Committee. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The reso-
lution will be received and referred to 
the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
the Armed Services Committee; and, 
without objection, the resolution will be 
printed in the RECORD. 
<See exhibit 1.) 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, we 
have had several hundred thousand men 
m uniform stationed in Europe since 
1951 when President Truman, respond-
Ing to the then existing situation and to 
a Senate sense resolution of that day, 
announced the first substantial post-
World War II increase in U.S. forces 
there. When Senate Resolution 49 was 
Introduced 2 years ago there were about 
372,000 military personnel in Europe, in-
cluding Turkey, Spain, and the 6th Fleet 
in the Mediterranean; this force was ac-
companied by some 240,000 dependents, 
a grand total of 612,000. There are now 
abouL 315.000 men- n l!uod reduct !on-
nnd Lhey nrc accuu1panied by :.!:!5.000 
dcpendents-noL n. good enough reduc-
tion-and 14,000 civilians employed by 
the U.S. Government. Thus. there are 
over 550,000 Americans in Europe today 
who are either in military service or as-
sociated with the military, and main-
tained wholly or largely by the Govern-
ment of the United States. 
We now have. overall, about 3.5 mil-
lion men under arms. Of this total, about 
1.2 million are stationed outside the 
United States. according to figures pro-
vided by the Department of Defense. In 
addition to those in Europe, there is a 
force of about 479,500 in Vietnam. 
May I say, parenthetically, that as of 
last Thursday, this is 4,500 in excess of 
the 60,000 announced withdrawal by the 
President of the United States, a \vith-
drawal which was to be met by December 
15, 1969. Thus, I congratulate the Presi-
dent for going beyond the 60,000 mark. 
I hope that this is a continuation of a 
policy which, perhaps, may not be an-
nounced but which will be continued in 
effect, to the end that more and more 
troops can be withdrawn as appropriately 
as possible from Vietnam and all of 
Southeast Asia. 
There are 129,000 in the fleets abroad, 
58,000 in Korea, 45,000 in Thailand, 42,-
000 on Okinawa, another 40,000 in Japan, 
28,000 in the Philippines, 24,000 in Latin 
America, 10,000 in North Africa and the 
Middle East, and another 10,000 in Can-
ada, Greenland, and Iceland. 
This commitment of men abroad ob-
viously represents an enormous cost to 
the people of the United States. It is re-
flected in a military budget of some $80 
b1llion and in the tax rates. It is also 
reflected in a balance-of-payments deficit 
which amounted to $1.3 b1llion in the 
first quarter of this year. 
Our net foreign exchange gap with 
Germany alone is now running at about 
$965 million per annum. This is the 
highest figure to date. In 1968, the figure 
was $887.4 million. It had been between 
$700 and $800 m!llion in the period 1963 
through 1967, and under $700 million in 
the years before 1963. 
In the past, part of this exchange gap 
has been covered through various agree-
ments with the West German Govern-
ment. In fiscal years 1962 through 1965 
these so-called offset agreements con-
sisted simply of commitments by the 
West German Government to procure 
military equipment in the United States. 
The agreement for fiscal years 1966 and 
1967 provided for military procurement 
plus the prepayment of a West German 
debt. The fiscal year 1968 agreement 
provided for military procurement plus 
purchase of special medium-term U.S. 
Treasury securities by the West German 
Government. In fiscal year 1969 the 
agreement provided for military procure-
ment plns the purchase of special U.S. 
Treasury securities by the West German 
Government, plus additional purchases 
of U.S. Treasury securities by West Ger-
man banks plus an agreement by Luft-
hansa to finance purchases of aircraft. 
I have had the Library of Congress 
draw up a table showing the terms of 
these so-called offset agreements between 
the United States and West Germany in 
fiscal yc:ns l!Hi:! LhrO\ll~h UJ69 nnd ·"" 
ununtmous CC'nxenL that 1t be pnntt•ci 111 
the RECORD nl the conclusion of mv • ,._ 
marks. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER \V1• .1 :· 
objection. it is so ordered. 
\See exhibit 2.> 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Pre~1drn t 
agreement was reached with the Wc~t 
German Government on July 9 coverin r• 
fiscal years 1970 and 1971. The agreement 
provides for an inflow of foreign ex-
change in the amount of $1.52 billion ovc1 
the next 2 years. In addition to militarv 
procurement in the United States. ih.r 
agreement provides for a West German 
Government loan, plus retention in the 
United States for 2 years of ini('rc:-.l 
earned by West Germany on U.S . Treas-
ury deposits, plus the purchase by West 
Germany of U.S. Export-Import Bank 
and Marshall Plan loans, plus West Ger-
man civil procurement in the United 
States, plus payment to a fund in the 
United States for encouraging German 
investment plus advance transfers for 
debt repayment by the West German 
Government to the United States. A con-
cessional interest rate of 3.5 percent will 
apply to the West German Government 
loan and to certain deposits In the U.S 
Treasury for military procurement. I ask 
unanimous consent that the text of a 
press release issued by the Department 
of State on July 9. giving the te1ms of the 
agreement, be printed in the RECORD at 
this point. 
There being no objection. the press re-
lease was ordered to be printed in tlw 
RECORD, as follows: 
PRESS STATEMENT 
The U.S. and German delegations an-
no unced today the conclusion of a new agree-
ment for offsetting foreign exchange costs of 
American forces In Germany for U.S. Fiscal 
Years 1970 and 1971. The delegations have 
been conferring In Washington this week 
on the third and concluding round of their 
talks. 
The agreement provides !or an Inflow of 
foreign exchange to the U.S. In the amount 
of 1.52 billion dollars. These Inflows will b~ 
achieved by $925 million of procurement of 
U.S. goods and services (61% of total agree-
ment) and $595 million of financial meas-
ures (39 % of total). 
Details are as follows : 
[In millions of dollars] 
Military procurement In the United 
States ------------------------ 800 U<• 
Federal Republic or Germany loan 
to the U.S. (repayable after ten 
years) ---- - ------------------- ~50 ()(t 
Purchase by Federal Republic or 
Germany of loans held In port-
folio of Eximbank a.nd of out-
standing Marshall Plan loans___ 1 16 7 i 
Civil procurement In the United 
States by Federa l Republic of 
Germany ______ -----· 1 ~5 011 
Creation of fund In U.S. by Feel-
era! Republic of Germ1ny to 
encourage German lm·estmen t 
In United S\a•cs__ --------- 150 ll" 
Advance tril.nsfers by the Federal 
Republic of Germany for debt 
repayment to the United States_ 13 7 ) 
Retention In the United States of 
Interest earned by the Federal 
Republic of Germany on US 
Treasury deposi ts __ __ ___ ------ 32 50 
Total --------------- ----- 1, 520 . 00 
It was agreed that the lntere6t rate which 
would apply to the Inter-government Joan 
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and to certain F'ederal Republic of ~rrna.ny 
deposits In the U.S. 'I'reasury !or procure-
ment would be 3.6 percent. 
The Export-Import Bank and Marshall 
Plan loans purchased by tihe Federal Re-
publlc or Germany would bea.r, on the aver-
age, a mte of interest at four percent with 
respect to certain loans and tl ve percent 
with respect to others. 
The U.S. delegation was led by Deputy 
Under Secretary of State Nathaniel Sa.muels; 
the German delegation was heeded by State 
Secretary Guenther Harkort of the For-
eign Office. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
would like to make several comments on 
the agreement. Before doing so, I should 
note that the Department of State ap-
parently believes that this agreement 
represents a considerable improvement 
over previous agreements. To be sure, the 
amount of the military procurement is 
greater than last year, or the previous 
years. The borrowing by the United 
States Is for a longer period than in the 
past and a concessional rate will apply 
to the West German Government's loan. 
The total amount is higher than ever be-
fore and the agreement is for 2 years in-
stead of only one. 
In those respects there has been "im-
provement." It would be well to bear in 
mind. however. that there is another side 
of the coin. While the amount of foreign 
exchange inftow involved is higher, so 
is the foreign exchange gap because it 
becomes more expensive every year to 
keep our forces in Germany. With the 
reevaluation of the Germany mark, 
moreover. this expense stated in dollars 
will increase again, and, possibly, more 
drastically than in the past. Further-
more. the agreement represents only 
about 80 percent of the foreign exchange 
outflow from the United States to Ger-
many in the coming 2 fiscal years. And, 
while the West German Government 
loan to the United States will carry a 
concessional interest rate of 3.5 percent, 
nevertheless it represents an obligation 
of the United States which must be re-
newed or redeemed; the interest will re-
sult in some annual capital outflow and 
the capital of the loan itself must be re-
garded as, eventually, a large item of out-
flow . Finally, since the agreement is for 
a 2-year period. it may imply a commit-
ment on our part to retain substantially 
the present level of U.S. forces in Ger-
many for the next 2 years whether or 
not that should prove desirable or In ac-
cord with our national needs now or a 
year from now. In fact, the new West 
German Chancellor said in an interview 
in the Novembrr 14 issue of Time maga-
zine that there was "an understanding 
on both sides," when agreement was 
reached on an offset arrangement for the 
next 2 years. that there would be no 
"substantial changes" in the level of U.S. 
forces during this period. 
No matter how the current agreement 
is regarded, there is no escaping the fact 
that the assignment of U.S. military 
forces in Germany and Europe is a vora-
cious consumer of U.S. resources, a 
source of inflation and, in present cir-
cumstances, a factor in the reduction in 
the international strength of the dollar. 
It is a cliche to say that the United 
States is a rich and powerful country. 
After the long drain of Vietnam, how-
ever, it may be w,ise to take another look 
at that glib assertion. In terms of surplus 
for necessary national purposes at home 
and abroad, we are beginning to scrape 
the bottom of the barrel. 
Other nations have come to realize 
that if they are to accomplish the essen-
tial tasks at home, it may be necessary 
to concentrate on only the essent.ial tasks 
abroad. In my judgment, it is long past 
time for us to face the facts of our situa-
tion and reach the same conclusion. In 
this connection, I welcome the Presi-
dent's July 9 order to reduce the number 
of military men based abroad by 14,900-
also h,is most recent order of a day or so 
ago in which approximately another 14,-
000, almost all in the Pacific area, will 
be reduced insofar as our Armed Forces 
are concerned-although in my judg-
ment it is regrettable that the reduction 
is so limited and that the forces com-
mitted to NATO have been completely 
exempted from this cut in military forces 
overseas. 
On April 15, I had printed in the REc-
ORD the defense policy statement made 
by the Canadian Prime Minister on April 
3. In that statement. Prime Minister 
Trudeau said: 
NATO itself is continuous ly reassessing the 
role It plays in the l!ght of changing world 
conditions. Perhaps the major development 
affecting NATO In Europe since the organiza-
tion was founded is the magnificent recovery 
of the economic strength of Western Europe. 
There has been a very great change In t he 
nb!l!ty of European countries themselves to 
provide necessary conventional defense forces 
and armaments to be deployed by the all!-
ance in Europe 
It was. therefore, in our view entirely ap-
propriate for Canada to review and re-exam-
ine the necessity In present circumstances for 
maintaining Canadian forces in Western 
Europe. Canadian forces are now committed 
to NATO until the end of the present year. 
The Canadian force commitment for d eploy-
ment with NATO In Europe beyond this 
period will be discussed with our allies at the 
Defense Planning Committee meeting in May. 
The Canadian Government Intends, In con-
sultation with Canada's allles, to take early 
steps to bring about a planned and phased 
reduction of the size of the Canadian forces 
in Europe. 
According to press reports, which I 
understand to be accurate, the present 
plan is to reduce the number of the Ca-
nadian contingent of about 10,000 in 
Western Germany to about 4,000. Thls is 
a small reduction in numbers but a large 
reduction in percentage and would seem 
to represent, in effect, a change in the 
Canadian estimate of the situation in 
Europe, as well as a revision of policy on 
the part of the Canadian Government. I 
would hope thls Nation would study the 
Canadian action most carefully. To me, it 
seems an adjustment which looks to the 
future Instead of to the past. 
Last year at this time, we, too, ap-
peared to be on the verge of moving in 
the same direction. There was wide-
spread support in the Senate for a pro-
posal by the distinguished Senator from 
Missouri <Mr. SYMlNGTON) whlch would 
have had the effect of lowering substan-
tially the level of our forces in Europe. 
Most regrettably, there was the occupa-
tion of Czechoslovakia on August 20 by 
400,000 Soviet and other Warsaw Pact 
forces. The time was one of extreme un-
certainty, with various obscure troop 
movements in Eastern Europe. It was far 
from clear that the relatively bloodless 
coup in Czechoslovakia would mark the 
culmination of this activity. There was 
fear that the difficulties in Eastern 
Europe might spread throughout Europe. 
As I stated at that time, a substan-
tial reduction in U.S. Forces in Europe 
in those circumstances could have been 
subject to misinterpretation in the East, 
and brought grave uncertainty in the 
West. I added, however, that, in my 
judgment, it remained desirable to un-
dertake a gradual reduction in U.S. forces 
if and when the situation in Easten1 
Europe offered reasonable assurance that 
developments there were not going to 
spill over into Western Europe. It seems 
to me that that time has now arrived. 
The Soviet Union faces se1ious problems 
in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in East-
ern Europe. If that were not enough, 
there is a difficult situation to the East 
on the Soviet-Chinese border. Soviet 
troops in Czechoslovakia, moreover, have 
been cut from several hundred thousand 
to about 70,000. While it is regrettable 
that the internal political life of that en-
lightened nation is again dictated by a 
foreign power, certain realities as they 
bear upon our military presence in 
Europe must be faced . What transpired 
in Czechoslovakia was not controllable 
In any fashion by NATO and bears no 
direct relationship to the question of the 
size of American forces assigned in Eu-
rope to that organization. Had there 
been only one or two divisions or, for 
that matter, seven or eight or 18 divi-
sions of Americans in Western Germany, 
instead of four or five, would they have 
had any different effect on the situation 
as it developed in Czechoslovakia last 
year? I can find no basis for any such 
contention. Events within Eastern Eu-
rope are, as they have been since the 
Hungarian interlude made apparent for 
all to see more than a decade ago, be-
yond the direct reach of t he North At-
lantic Treaty and the mili tary structure 
of NATO. 
Nevertheless, it will be argued. as it is 
always argued, that the time is not right 
to make a substantial reduction of our 
forces in Europe. But it seems that the 
time is never right. I am aware of the 
recent press reports. for example, im-
plying that NATO may be on the point 
of makmg a proposal to the Soviet Union 
and its Warsaw Pact allie'l for negotia-
tions on reducing conventlonal forces in 
Europe. I would like to point out, how-
ever, that NATO has been studying the 
subject of balanced force reductions for 
years. My understanding i.; that there is 
still no agreed NATO proposal for bal-
anced force reductions and it is not 
planned that there will be one until at 
least early in the summer. Even then, 
there is no reason to assume that dis-
cussions, much less full neJotiations. will 
begin, for there has been no indication, 
direct or indirect, that the Soviet Union 
is interested in such discussions. 
It will also be argued, as it is always 
argued, that bringing a substantial num-
ber of forces back from Europe will not 
affect our defense budget because we 
cannot reduce the number of men under 
arms. But it is also argued that it is not 
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possible to reduce the number of men 
under arms because of the need to meet 
our NATO and other overseas commit-
ments. This endless circle leading, in the 
end, to fiscal exhaustion can and must 
be broken. 
I am not now advocating, and I have 
not In the past advocated, that all U.S. 
troops be removed from Europe. Our 
vital Interest 1n what transpires in 
Europe remains and a U.S. presence 
should remain. In this day and age an 
armed attack on Western Europe will 
certainly involve us almost from the out-
set. It is to our interest, therefore, that 
we are present before the outset. That 
need can be met, In my judgment, and 
should be met with a much smaller mili-
tary force. 
At the same time, a substantial reduc-
tion of our forces 1n Europe would have 
certain immediately beneficial effects on 
this Nation. In the first place, the balance 
of payments should soon refiect a sharp 
decrease in outfiow for military purposes, 
even as It becomes possible to bring 
about a reduction 1n the National mili-
tary budget. In the second place, a re-
duction 1n U.S. forces in Western Europe 
might provide some impetus for Western 
Europeans to develop their own defense 
efforts In line With their needs and to 
work together more closely 1n doing so. 
Integrated defense is supposed to be 
what NATO is all about. To the extent 
that we have continued to overpartici-
pate in the defense of Europe, it follows 
that there has been far less interest in 
bearing the burdens of that defense 
among the Europeans themselves. 
Finally, a substantial reduction of 
American forces would help to correct 
what I regard as a distorted relation-
ship between Europe and the United 
States. The Soviet Union maintains half 
a million soldiers in Eastern Europe. 
Wb1le the Russians may ascribe this 
presence to a threat from the West, the 
fact is that the Soviet presence is also 
a significant factor in maintaining com-
munist governments in power, as Czech-
oslovakia has so clearly !llustrated. The 
democracies have no need of U.S. forces 
in order to maintain themselves within 
the nations of Western Europe; yet, that 
most significant political fact is cUsgulsed 
by our military presence in such great 
magnitude. 
In my judgment, it is not a desirable 
situation for a foreign power either in 
Eastern Europe or Western Europe to 
keep somewhere in the neighborhood of 
a million men in these two camps, a quar-
ter of a century after the events which 
initially put them there. Both contingents 
are somewhat anachronistic, to say the 
least. Yet the continuing presence of the 
one has become the principal basis for 
the continuing presence of the other. The 
persistence of the anachronism leads not 
only to a distortion of political relation-
ships, but to a distortion of economic 
relationships. Indeed, the annual offset 
negotiation with the West German Gov-
ernment is a case very much in point. 
West Germany Is, 1n effect, becoming a 
major banker for this Nation 1n order 
that we may pay !or the continued llUlJ.n-
tenance of U.S. forces in Germany at 
this Nation's expense. 
In short, the presence of American 
forces in Europe in such large numbers, in 
my judgment, has vestiges, if not of 
empire in a 19th century sense, then of 
military occupation and of the costly cold 
war and of the one-time complete pre-
eminence of the dollar in international 
finance. Yet the age of empire, the era 
of occupation, the period of the cold war 
and one-sided financial preeminence are 
of the past. The persistence of these 
vestiges in present policies involves, 1n 
my judgment, a wasteful and dangerous 
use of our available fiscal resources. It 
acts to debilitate this Nation's capacity, 
both at home and abroad, to deal with the 
urgent problems of the contemporary 
era. 
ExHIBIT 1 
S. RES. 292 
Whereas the foreign policy and military 
strength of the United States a.re dedicated 
to the protection of our national security, 
the preservation of the liberties of the 
American people, and the maintenance of 
world peace; and 
Whereas the United States, in Implement-
Ing these principles, has maintained large 
contingents of American Armed Forces In 
Europe, together with air and naval units, 
for twenty years; and 
Whereas the security of the United States 
and Its citizens remains Interwoven with 
the security of other nations signatory to 
the North Atlantic Treaty as it was when 
the treaty was signed, but the condition of 
our European allies, both economlca.lly and 
militarily, has appreciably lmproyed since 
lArge con tlngen ts of forces were deployed; 
and 
Whereas the means and capacity of all 
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganlzation to provide forces to resist aggres-
sion has significantly Improved since the 
original United States deployment; and 
Whereas the commitment by all members 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Is based upon 
1ihe full cooperation of all treaty partners in 
contributing materials and men on a. fair a.nct 
equitable basis, but such contributions have 
not been forthcoming from all other m.em-
bers of the organization; and 
Whereas relations between Eastern Europe 
and Western Europe were tense when the 
large contingents of United States forces 
were deployed In Europe but this situation 
has now undergone substantial change and 
relations between the two parts of Europe 
are now characterized by an Increasing 
two-way flow of trade, people and other 
peaceful exchange; and 
Whereas the present policy of maintaining 
large contingents of United States forces 
and their dependents on the European Con-
tinent also contributes further to the fiscal 
and monetary problems of the United States: 
Now, therefore, be it 
Resolv ed, Tha.t--
(1) it is the sense of tlul Senate that, with 
changes and improvements In the techniques 
of modern warfare and because of the va&t 
increase in capaoity of the Unlted States to 
wage war and to move mllita.ry forces and 
equipment by air, a substantial reduction of 
United States forces permanently stationed 
1n Europe can be made without adversely 
affecting either our resolve or ability to meet 
our oomm!tment under the North Atlantic 
Treaty; 
. (2) S. Res. 99, adopted 1n the Senate 
April 4, 1951, is am.ended to contain the 
provisions of this resolution and, wilere the 
resolutions may oontllct, the pil"e6ent r'l60lu-
tl.on is oonttroll!ng as to the l!enee of the 
Senate. 
Tc•rms oj offset ag1c·cmrnts l>rftl't'f'll Ulr 
Untted Stairs and Wcstcr·11 Gcrm a n11 fi{\-
cnl 1962 1 !169 · · 
I In millions of <iollnrs 1 
Agrn·rl 
Flscnl years nnd term~ ngrecd hy u, qct 
Western Germany: 1>aym(lnts 
1962-1963. Mlll tary procurement bv 
Wes t Germany from the United 
States ------------- __ -------- 1.375 
1964-1965, Mllltary procurement by 
West Germany from the Umted 
States ------ - ------ ____ ·- __ 1 3:5 
1966-1967, Military procureme1.t by 
West Germany from the Uruted 
St ates plus prepayment of West 
German debt to the United States 
in the amount of $192 million ___ I . 350 
1966, Military procurement by West 
Germany from the United States_ 100 
1966, Purchase by West Germany of 
special U.S. Treasury securities___ 500 
Total ------------------------ 600 
1966, West Germany agreed that the 
Bundesbank would continue Its 
practice of not converting dollars 
into gold. 
1969, Mllltary procurement by West 
Germany from the United States_ 100 
1969, Purchase by West Germany of 
special U.S. Treasury sec uri ties___ 500 
1969, Purchase of U.S. Treasury se-
curities by West German banks___ 125 
Total ------------------------ 725 
1969, Lufthansa agreed to fl.nance 
$60 million purchase of aircraft in 
West Germany rather than U.S. 
market. 
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